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Abstract
In practice, two types of tournaments can be distinguished − U-type
and J-type tournaments. In U-type tournaments, workers receive prizes that
have been ﬁxed in advance. In J-type tournaments, the employer ﬁxes an
aggregate wage bill in advance, which is then shared among the workers
according to their relative performance. The results of the paper show that
the outcomes of the two tournament types substantially diﬀer. Especially, an
employer will prefer J-type to U-type tournaments if the number of workers
is large, whereas the opposite holds for small numbers of workers.
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11 Introduction
Workers’ outputs and human capital investments often cannot be veriﬁed by
a third party (e.g., a court) in practice. These outputs or human capital
investments are called unveriﬁable or non-contractible, because explicit la-
bor contracts cannot be made contingent on them. For this reason, labor
contracts are often incomplete leaving room for opportunistic behavior. For
example, an employer can promise a worker to pay high bonuses for high
outputs. But if these outputs are unveriﬁable, a rational employer will save
labor costs by claiming that the worker’s output was low in case of a high
output. Anticipating the employer’s opportunistic behavior the worker will
have no incentives to exert any eﬀort.
Malcomson (1984, 1986) oﬀers a practical solution to this unveriﬁability
problem. He shows that tournament compensation schemes will be con-
tractible, even if the workers’ outputs are unveriﬁable.1In tournaments work-
ers are compensated according to the ordinal ranks of their realized outputs.
The tournament prizes are ﬁxed in advance, before the tournament starts.
Since the ﬁxed tournament prizes are veriﬁable by court, the employer can-
not save labor costs by understating the workers’ realized outputs (i.e., if the
employer does not declare the worker with the highest output the winner of
the tournament, the winner prize will be given to another worker). Thus,
2the employer will correctly allocate the workers to their ranks. By antici-
pating this, workers will have strong incentives for exerting eﬀort to attain
the winner prize in the tournament. There are a lot of examples for this
tournament solution in practice, e.g. job promotion tournaments within a
corporate hierarchy or tournaments between salesmen.
Kanemoto and MacLeod (1989, 1992) argue that in the evolutionary pro-
cess of labor market institutions two diﬀerent types of tournaments have
evolved as alternative solutions to the unveriﬁability problem. The ﬁrst type
is a kind of job promotion tournament and can be observed in U.S. ﬁrms
(see, e.g., Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstr¨ om 1994a, 1994b). Here, the tourna-
ment prizes are wages that are attached to jobs along a ﬁrm’s hierarchy.
The wages rise with increasing hierarchy level. On each level of the hierar-
chy, workers compete in tournaments against each other to win a promotion
to the next level. As the hierarchical wage structure of a ﬁrm is veriﬁable,
this type of tournament prevents employers from opportunistic behavior and,
therefore, gives eﬀort incentives to workers. Such job promotion tournaments
can be called (U.S. or) U-type tournaments.
The second type of tournament can be found in Japanese ﬁrms and will be
called J-type tournaments.2Here, the employer agrees on an aggregate wage
bill for his workers that is speciﬁed by an explicit contract between the ﬁrm
and the local union. For example, this wage bill can be the amount of bonuses
3which are biannually payed by large Japanese ﬁrms to their workers.3When
the employer has signed the collective agreement, he can no longer save labor
costs by opportunistically rating his workers’ outputs, because the aggregate
wage bill is veriﬁable. By using a tournament the wage bill is then shared
among the workers.4For this purpose, each worker takes place in a rating or
assessment process (”satei”), in which the workers are subjectively evaluated
by their supervisors (e.g., Itoh 1991; Endo 1994). This assessment process
can be called a tournament, because the more merit points a worker has
made the larger is his individual share in the aggregate wage bill compared
to the other workers. If, for example, in a ﬁrm with two workers A and B
the supervisor claims that A’s unveriﬁable output has been three times as
high as B’s, then A will receive 75% of the wage bill and B only 25%.
This paper will discuss the questions, whether U-type and J-type tourna-
ments substantially diﬀer, and which tournament type is preferable from an
employer’s viewpoint. I will focus on the central issue that tournaments will
lead to contractible incentive schemes even if workers’ outputs are unveriﬁ-
able. For this purpose, incentive problems due to hidden action are neglected.
Therefore, this paper assumes a deterministic production technology for the
workers (i.e., the output only depends on a worker’s eﬀort and not on an ad-
ditional noise term or exogenous random variable). Hence, the model refers
to situations where output is mainly determined by a worker’s behavior and
4where the monitoring precision of supervisors is high.5Such situations can be
often found in industrial production where the technical context and produc-
tion breakdowns are usually observed by the employer. The model ﬁts less
well with the situation of salespersons, whose results are also determined by
exogenous market conditions (especially, the customers). The results of the
model will show that the two tournament types clearly diﬀer. Especially, we
will see that from an employer’s viewpoint J-type tournaments have compar-
ative advantages when discussing horizontal collusion between the workers,
human capital investments in a previous stage prior to the tournament, and
tournaments with many workers.
In Section 2, the basic model is introduced. Section 3 compares the
outcomes of U-type and J-type tournaments. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Basic Model
A (U-type or J-type) ﬁrm is considered which employs two risk neutral work-
ers A and B. Each worker has the same production function qi = ei where ei
denotes worker i’s (i = A,B) observable but unveriﬁable eﬀort.6Eﬀort entails
costs to a worker, which are described by c(ei) with c(0) = 0, c0(ei) > 0, and
c00 (ei) > 0. Output and costs are both measured in monetary terms. The
reservation utility of each worker is given by ¯ u ≥ 0. Both workers want to
5maximize their expected net income, i.e. their expected wages net oﬀ the ex-
pected costs. It is assumed that the workers are not able to pay up-front fees
because of restricted wealth. The employer is assumed to be risk neutral,
too. He wants to maximize expected proﬁts, i.e. expected outputs minus
wages.
In a U-type tournament the employer speciﬁes a winner prize w1 and a
loser prize w2 (with 0 ≤ w2 < w1) to induce work incentives and to make the
two workers participate in the tournament. Let ∆w = w1 − w2 be the prize
spread. Worker i will win the tournament if qi > qj (i,j = A,B; i 6= j). In
the case of qi < qj worker i loses. If qi = qj the employer will determine the
winner by ﬂipping a fair coin so that each worker’s probability of winning is
1/2.
In a J-type tournament the employer chooses an aggregate wage bill w
before the tournament starts. Worker i gets the fraction qi/(qi + qj) of the
wage bill w given that at least one worker exerts positive eﬀort (i,j = A,B;
i 6= j). If qi = qj = 0, each worker will receive the wage w/2. The timing
structure is identical in both tournaments. On the ﬁrst stage, the employer
chooses (w1,w2) in the U-type tournament and w in the J-type tournament.
On the second stage, given that the two workers A and B decide to participate
in the tournament they simultaneously choose their eﬀorts eA and eB.
In the following section, the U-type and the J-type tournament are com-
6pared. First, the basic model is considered. Then, this model will be ex-
tended to discuss the possibility of collusions, relative deprivation, human
capital investments, and tournaments between more than two workers.
3 Results
3.1 Comparison with the First-Best Solution
As the employer and the two workers are all risk neutral it makes sense to
compare the outcomes of the U-type and the J-type tournament to the ﬁrst-
best outcome as a reference solution. Under ﬁrst-best conditions there are
no observability and contracting problems. Therefore, the employer would
choose the eﬀort level that maximizes ei −c(ei) for each worker i (i = A,B)
and would pay each worker a wage that just compensates him for the costs
c(ei) and the reservation utility ¯ u. This leads to the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition The outcome where each worker exerts eﬀort eFB = c
0−1 (1)




will be called ﬁrst-best solution.7
Deriving the subgame perfect equilibrium of the U-type and the J-type
tournament we obtain the following result:
Proposition 1 Neither the U-type nor the J-type tournament yields the
7ﬁrst-best solution.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The proof of Proposition 1 shows that in both tournament types the em-
ployer is able to implement ﬁrst-best eﬀorts (on average), but not at ﬁrst-best
costs. In the J-type tournament, the employer does not want to implement
ﬁrst-best eﬀorts, because eFB would imply negative proﬁts. The result con-
cerning the U-type tournament seems to be even more surprising. The sem-
inal article by Lazear and Rosen (1981) has already shown that the U-type
tournament with two homogeneous and risk neutral workers and stochas-
tic production generates the ﬁrst-best solution. The intuition for this result
is clear: Since both workers are risk neutral there is no trade-oﬀ between
incentives and risk sharing. Thus, the employer is able to induce optimal in-
centives without risk premia. In this paper, production is deterministic. At
ﬁrst sight, we might suppose that this would make things even better. But
the proof of Proposition 1 shows that the opposite is true. Because of deter-
ministic production there only exists a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies
on the tournament stage of the game. Theoretically, the employer may be
able to choose the tournament prizes w1 and w2 so that a worker’s expected
eﬀort equals eFB.8Nevertheless, the ﬁrst-best solution cannot be obtained,




convexity of c(·) and Jensen’s inequality.
8This surprising result has a direct implication for the design of U-type
tournaments in practice. In the model of Lazear and Rosen (1981) stochastic
outputs are described by qi = ei + εi (i = A,B) where the noise terms εA
and εB are identically and independently distributed. These noise terms
can be interpreted as measurement errors due to imperfect monitoring. In
analogy, we can argue that the deterministic production function qi = ei is
achieved by perfect monitoring. But then Proposition 1 makes clear that
imperfect monitoring is strictly better, since it leads to ﬁrst-best eﬀorts and
a reduction of monitoring costs. According to Proposition 1, the employer
would even prefer the existence of measurement errors to perfect monitoring
if monitoring costs were zero.
Unfortunately, the general form of the cost function c(ei) does not allow
a direct comparison between the eﬀorts and the employer’s expected proﬁts
in the U-type and the J-type tournament. Both tournament types have sym-
metric subgame perfect equilibria. Let E

eU
denote a worker’s expected
equilibrium eﬀort in a U-type tournament and eJ the equilibrium eﬀort of
a worker in the J-type tournament. Furthermore, let EΠU (EΠJ) be the
employer’s expected proﬁts per worker in a U-type tournament (J-type tour-
nament) and EΠFB the expected proﬁts per worker with ﬁrst-best eﬀort.
Using a quadratic cost function the following result can be obtained:
Corollary 1 If c(ei) = (k/2) · e2




> eJ and EΠFB > EΠU > EΠJ.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The proof of the corollary shows that the participation constraint is bind-
ing in the U-type tournament, whereas workers receive more than their reser-
vation utilities in the J-type tournament. But, more importantly, workers
exert less eﬀort in the J-type than in the U-type tournament on average. In
addition, the employer’s expected proﬁts per worker are larger in the U-type
than in the J-type tournament. Thus, the corollary indicates that the U-type
tournament seems to dominate the J-type tournament from the employer’s
viewpoint. The following results will show that this conclusion does not hold.
3.2 Collusion between the Workers
In the literature also some problems of tournaments have been mentioned.
Many authors suppose that collusion between the workers will be one of the
major problems of tournaments.9Obviously, collusion in which all workers
agree to exert zero eﬀort will be Pareto eﬃcient from the workers’ viewpoint.
Consider, for example, the above two-person U-type or J-type tournament.
In both cases, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium on the tournament
stage which is symmetric and in which the workers exert positive eﬀorts.
Thus, the two workers are strictly better oﬀ by both choosing zero eﬀort.
10Their expected wages are still (w1 + w2)/2 or w/2, respectively, but the
workers will save their (expected) eﬀort costs. Therefore, collusion would
lead to a Pareto improvement for the workers. But since there is a unique
equilibrium in each type of tournament, a collusive agreement cannot be
stable in a one-shot game.10If the tournament between the same two workers
is repeated several times, a collusive agreement may become self-enforcing.
A ﬁnitely repeated tournament cannot lead to stable collusion because of the
backward-induction argument. But as we know from the Folk Theorem, a
collusion equilibrium can be achieved in a tournament supergame with an
inﬁnite number of repetitions (or with an unknown endgame, respectively).
Let δ = 1/(1 + r) be the workers’ discount factor for future payoﬀs with r as
interest rate. In addition, assume that both workers use the grim strategy to
enforce their collusive agreement.11Then, the following result can be derived:
Proposition 2 There exist lower bounds δ
U and δ
Jfor U-type and J-type
tournament supergames so that collusion will be stable if δ ≥ δ





Proof. See the Appendix.
The proposition states that in a tournament supergame stable collusion
may be possible in U-type as well as in J-type tournaments. But as δ
J ≥
δ
U hold for the two threshold levels, stable collusion is more likely in U-
type than in J-type tournaments. Thus, concerning possible collusion an
11employer prefers J-type to U-type tournaments. The intuition for the result
of Proposition 2 is based on two facts: First, if a worker deviates from the
collusive agreement in the J-type tournament by choosing an arbitrarily small
but positive eﬀort he will receive the total aggregate wage bill. If a worker
deviates from collusion in the U-type tournament he will only get the winner
prize whereas the other worker receives the loser prize. Altogether, incentives
for deviating should be greater in the J-type than in the U-type tournament.
Second, note that the participation constraint of the one-shot game is al-
ways binding in U-type tournaments (i.e., each worker receives his reservation
utility ¯ u), whereas this is not clear for J-type tournaments. Especially, the
proof of Corollary 1 shows that participants of J-type tournaments get more
than ¯ u. The proof of Proposition 1 shows that in U-type tournaments there is
always complete rent dissipation on the tournament stage, i.e. each worker’s
expected utility will always equal the loser prize w2, no matter whether w2
is high or low. Hence, the best the employer can do is to choose w1 = ¯ u
to minimize labor costs, which makes the participation constraint binding.
Therefore, workers’ incentives to deviate from a collusive agreement will be
greater in J-type than in U-type tournaments: When cooperation breaks
down and the workers play their one-shot Nash equilibrium strategies, work-
ers’ expected utilities are larger in J-type tournaments in each round. Hence,
the favourable property of a U-type tournament − a binding participation
12constraint − becomes an unfavourable one in a dynamic context from the
employer’s viewpoint.
Besides, the proof of Proposition 2 shows that, contrary to J-type tour-
naments, the condition for a collusive equilibrium in U-type tournaments
(i.e., δ ≥ δ
U) is independent of the tournament prizes w1 and w2. Thus,
the employer cannot adjust the two prizes to make collusion in the U-type
tournament supergame more diﬃcult.
3.3 Relative Deprivation
In practice, people sometimes do not only care for their absolute but also for
their relative incomes, compared to a certain reference group. Such prefer-
ences are described by the concept of relative deprivation (RD).12A person
will be relatively deprived, if his income is lower than the income of a chosen
reference group. The larger this income diﬀerence and the group size are, the
larger is the individual’s RD. Combining RD with tournaments makes some
sense, because the participants of a tournament naturally compare them-
selves to each other, and the losers may feel relatively deprived compared to
the winners of the tournament. The workers who compete against each other







RD denote the workers’ (expected) eﬀorts in the U-type or J-
13type tournament with RD workers, respectively, and EΠU
RD and EΠJ
RD the
corresponding values for the employer’s expected proﬁts per worker. Then
we have the following results:









for a given prize spread ∆w, and eJ
RD > eJ for a given
aggregate wage bill w,
(ii) EΠU
RD > EΠU > EΠJ
RD > EΠJ when costs are quadratic,
(iii) in neither type of tournament there is proﬁtable collusion.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Result (i) is similar to the results for tournaments with noise (see Kr¨ akel
2000). Minimizing the relative income diﬀerence instead of maximizing ab-
solute income leads to higher eﬀorts for given wages. Here, the competition
between only two workers suﬃces to generate this eﬀort eﬀect. Result (ii) de-
scribes a ranking for the employer’s expected proﬁts per worker. Given RD
workers the employer again prefers the U-type to the J-type tournament.
The result also shows that the employer prefers organizing a tournament be-
tween RD workers to a competition between non-RD workers for each type
of tournament (i.e., EΠi
RD > EΠi with i = U,J). This is not surprising,
because RD workers weight their income diﬀerences with the relative size of
the reference group, and because the employer need not compensate the RD
workers for their absolute eﬀort costs. Result (iii) becomes clear by the fact
14that in either type of tournament there is a symmetric equilibrium. Since
workers only care about the relative income diﬀerence which is zero in a
symmetric equilibrium, they cannot proﬁtably deviate from this equilibrium
by both exerting zero eﬀort. The only way to gain by a collusive agreement
would be to choose a slightly higher eﬀort than the other worker, but this
worker would never agree to such collusion.
3.4 Human Capital Investment
Often workers do not only compete against each other by exerting eﬀort,
but also by accumulating human capital. Therefore, the basic model will
be extended by introducing human capital investment of the workers before
the tournament starts. Now, it is assumed that each type of tournament
consists of three stages. On the ﬁrst stage, the employer chooses (w1,w2)
or w, respectively. On the second stage, each worker makes an investment
in his human capital. He chooses an ability parameter ai (i = A,B) with
ai ∈ {0,1}.14This means that a worker can either agree (ai = 1) or disagree
(ai = 0) to take part in training activities. The low ability level ai = 0
entails zero costs to the worker. The high ability level ai = 1 leads to
costs c > 0 which are suﬃciently small so that human capital investment
may be rational. On the the third stage, the two workers know aA and aB,
15and choose their eﬀort levels to become the winner of a U-type or a J-type
tournament, respectively. The production function of worker i (i = A,B) is
now characterized by qi = aiei. This means that if worker i has dropped out
of the competition on the previous stage by choosing ai = 0, he would now
rationally choose ei = 0 to minimize his costs c(ei). If worker i has chosen
ai = 1, he would have the same production function qi = ei as described in
Section 2. For this modiﬁed game the following results can be derived:
Proposition 4a In the three-stage U-type tournament there are two sub-
game perfect equilibria: (i): w∗
1 = w∗
2 = 0, and the workers do not participate.
(ii): On the ﬁrst stage, w∗



















w1 + ¯ u
2
)
subject to ∆w ≥ ¯ c with ∆w = w1 − ¯ u. On the second stage, worker
i(i = A,B) chooses a∗
i = 0 with probability ¯ c/∆w, and a∗
i = 1 with probabil-
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where x is a random variable with cdf G(x) = c(x)/∆w over the interval
[0,c−1(∆w)], and ε being an arbitrarily small but positive number.15
Proof. See the Appendix.
16The results of Proposition 4a indicate that U-type tournaments become
highly problematic when workers should invest in human capital prior to the
tournament. In equilibrium (i) the employer decides to shut down produc-
tion. The proof of Proposition 4a shows that otherwise the employer would
make negative proﬁts, because on the second stage one of the workers would
drop out of the tournament (i.e., he chooses ai = 0) which would imply zero
incentives for both workers on the third stage.
Equilibrium (ii) has also some disadvantages from the employer’s view-
point compared to the results for the basic model without human capital
investment. In equilibrium (ii), the collective output of the two workers is
only strictly positive with probability (∆w − ¯ c)
2 /∆w2. Then, both workers
realize a∗
i = a∗
j = 1 on the second stage and choose mixed strategies accord-
ing to G(x) on the third stage, which lead to the same expected eﬀorts as in
the basic model (see the proof of Proposition 1). Of course, the employer can
raise the probability (∆w − ¯ c)
2 /∆w2 by increasing w1,16but this would lead
to high labor costs and, therefore, to low proﬁts. Thus, we have an additional
trade-oﬀ which becomes clear by looking at the employer’s objective function











of the employer’s objective function is identical with the objective function
in the basic model.17Hence, the employer’s expected proﬁts are strictly less
in the case with human capital investment because of the multiplication with
17the joint probability (∆w − ¯ c)
2 /∆w2.
At last, we can speculate which of the two subgame perfect equilibria
is the most plausible one. There are good reasons why the equilibrium (ii)
should be expected as outcome of the three-stage game. We see that the two
workers receive their reservation utility in each of the two equilibria,18but the
employer’s expected proﬁts are only positive in equilibrium (ii). Thus, Pareto
eﬃciency (or, alternatively, coalition proofness in the sense of Bernheim,
Peleg, and Whinston 1987) would lead to equilibrium (ii) as the outcome of
the game.
Proposition 4b In the three-stage J-type tournament there exists the fol-







4e = c0 (e) and w
2 − c(e) − ¯ c ≥ ¯ u. On the second stage, a∗
i = 1
(i = A,B). On the third stage, each worker chooses e∗
i with w∗
4e∗
i = c0 (e∗
i)
(i = A,B).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 4b shows that the results for the J-type tournament are nearly
identical to the results in the basic model without human capital investment.
This becomes obvious by comparing Proposition 4b with the proofs of Propo-
sition 1 and Corollary 1. The only diﬀerence is that now the employer has to
compensate the two workers for their human capital investment. Therefore,
we have the same optimization problem for the employer with the exception
18that the workers’ adjusted reservation utility in the participation constraint
is now ¯ u + ¯ c.
The analysis of human capital investment prior to the tournament has
been very speciﬁc, because there are only two possible investment levels. In
general, we have more than two levels. This yields the following result:
Corollary 2 If there are more than two − discrete or continuous −
investment levels, the two workers will choose mixed strategies on each of the
last two stages in the U-type tournament.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The corollary claims that in general the two workers will randomize on
both stages in the U-type tournament. But the more investment levels exist
the higher is the probability that the workers have diﬀerent levels of human
capital when the tournament starts.19However, such tournaments with het-
erogeneous workers are not desirable from the employer’s viewpoint. The
worker with more human capital is always able to win the tournament with
certainty, which would completely discourage the other worker. In equilib-
rium, both workers still choose mixed strategies over the interval [0,c−1(∆w)]
on the third stage of game, but the worker with less human capital will drop
out of the tournament with a certain probability. This drop-out probability
raises in the diﬀerence of the human capital investment of the two workers.
This has also important implications for situations in practice where workers
19do not simultaneously choose their human capital investment on the second
stage of the game. Then, each worker may have an incentive to realize a
ﬁrst-mover advantage by choosing a high amount of human capital before
the investment decision of the other worker to discourage this worker. On
the other hand, regardless whether the workers choose their human capital
investment simultaneously or sequentially, the employer will have some in-
terest in concealing the information about the realized investment levels so
that the workers do not know who is the stronger player.
3.5 n-Person Tournaments
All previous results deal with the case of a two-person tournament. Now, it
will be discussed whether the major ﬁndings also hold for tournaments with
n > 2 workers.20Since in the standard U-type tournament there is only one
vacant job for which the workers compete, we have one winner prize w1 and
n − 1 loser prizes w2. Let E[eU
n] denote a worker’s expected eﬀort. Then we
get the following proposition:
Proposition 5a In the U-type tournament with n > 2 workers there
exists a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium where the employer chooses
w∗
















w1 + (n − 1)¯ u
n
)
20with ∆w = w1 − ¯ u on the ﬁrst stage, and the workers choose an eﬀort x







over the interval [0,c−1 (∆w)] on the second stage. In equilibrium dw∗
1/dn >
0, whereas the sign of dE[eU
n]/dn is ambiguous. Furthermore, there exists a
continuum of asymmetric equilibria.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The result of Proposition 5a is similar to the results for rent-seeking con-
tests (see Baye, Kovenock and de Vries 1996, p. 293). The existence of
asymmetric equilibria is also intuitively plausible. In the symmetric equi-
librium, each worker’s expected utility equals the loser prize w2 (i.e., there
is complete rent dissipation among the workers). Thus, a worker will be
indiﬀerent between choosing an eﬀort level according to G(x) or dropping
out of the tournament by choosing zero eﬀort and getting w2 with certainty.
Therefore, n − 1 workers competing actively with cdf G(x) and one worker
dropping out will also be an equilibrium. Especially, there is an equilibrium
where n − 2 workers drop out and only two workers remain active. This
equilibrium is the least preferred one by the employer, because he pays each
of the n−2 passive workers w2 = ¯ u for doing nothing so that expected proﬁts
may become negative.
21Comparative statics for the symmetric equilibrium show that the winner
prize w∗
1 and, therefore, the prize spread ∆w raise with increasing n. Thus,
an increase in worker competition will result in a higher hierarchical wage
diﬀerential. However, the eﬀect of n on a worker’s expected eﬀort is am-
biguous. Whether increased competition encourages or discourages a worker
depends on the tournament size n and the shape of the cost function c(ei).
Proposition 5b In the J-type tournament with n > 2 workers there ex-
ists a unique and symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium where the employer






subject to w = n2
n−1ec0 (e) and w
n − c(e) ≥ ¯ u
on the ﬁrst stage, and the workers choose eJ







on the second stage, where deJ
n/dn > 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 5b about J-type tournaments is surprising. Although there
are many workers in the tournament with many possible eﬀort combinations
there only exists a unique and symmetric equilibrium. The workers’ equilib-
rium eﬀorts will always be smaller than the ﬁrst-best eﬀort regardless whether
n is small or large. In contrast to U-type tournaments, comparative statics
show that in J-type tournaments increased competition unambiguously leads
to higher equilibrium eﬀorts.




n for U-type and J-
type tournament supergames with n workers using the grim strategy so that
22collusion will be stable, if δ ≥ δ
U
n and δ ≥ δ
J







n is independent of w1 and w2, whereas δ
J
n depends on w;
whether an increase of w raises or lessens the possibility of stable collusion
crucially depends on the shape of c(ei). In the U-type tournament collusion
becomes less stable with increasing n, whereas this is not clear for the J-type
tournament.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The result of Proposition 6 shows that concerning possible collusion the
major ﬁndings for two-person tournaments also hold for n-person tourna-
ments: The possibility of stable collusion is higher in U-type than in J-type
tournaments. Again, the employer cannot inﬂuence this possibility by suit-
ably choosing w1 and w2 in the U-type tournament, whereas the possibility
of stable collusion in J-type tournaments depends on the aggregate wage bill
w. Stability of collusion in U-type tournaments decreases in n. This ﬁnding
is very plausible. In practice, collusion typically emerges in small groups
between persons that trust each other. In this context, the result is caused
by the fact that each worker’s expected utility from colluding decreases in
n and the expected utility from deviating from the collusion is independent
of n.21There is no clear result for the J-type tournament, because here both
expected utilities depend on n.
At last, we can examine which tournament type is more proﬁtable from






denote the employer’s ex-







the expected proﬁts per worker from a n-
person J-type tournament (with RD workers). In addition, let eJ
n,RD be a
worker’s equilibrium eﬀort in a J-type tournament between n RD workers.
Then we can derive the following results:






n,RD as n becomes suﬃciently large,
(ii) eJ
n,RD and EΠJ
n,RD are independent of n.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The results of Proposition 7 are restricted to symmetric equilibria to
make the outcomes of the two tournament types comparable. Moreover, the
asymmetric equilibria in the U-type tournament between non-RD workers are
strictly worse than the symmetric one from the employer’s viewpoint (e.g.,
the discussion of Proposition 5a has shown that in U-type tournaments there
exists an asymmetric equilibrium where n−2 workers choose zero eﬀort). In
addition, symmetric equilibria seem to be more plausible than asymmetric
equilibria in this context, since all workers are homogeneous. Result (i)
shows that the employer’s expected proﬁts per worker will be higher in J-
type than in U-type tournaments if the number of workers is large. This
24result holds for non-RD as well as for RD workers. Thus, the special result
of Corollary 1 with two workers and quadratic costs cannot be generalized.
On the contrary, an employer should organize a tournament between a large
number of workers as a J-type tournament. The intuition for this result will
be discussed below in connection with Corollary 3. Result (ii) shows that the
workers’ equilibrium eﬀorts and the employer’s expected proﬁts per worker
in a J-type tournament with RD workers do not change with the tournament
size. The proof of Proposition 7 makes clear that this result arises because the
workers weight their income diﬀerences with the relative size of the reference
group, 1/n, so that n cancels out in the employer’s objective function when
substituting for the workers’ reaction function.
The intuition for the proﬁtableness of J-type tournaments becomes clearer
when considering the special case of quadratic costs c(ei) = k
2e2






be a worker’s expected eﬀort in a U-type tournament with n
RD workers:
Corollary 3 In the symmetric equilibria of the n-person tournaments














/dn < 0 and deJ
n/dn > 0,















/dn < 0 and deJ
n,RD/dn = 0.
25Proof. See the Appendix.
The results of Corollary 3 show that the (expected) eﬀort and the em-
ployer’s expected proﬁts per worker are only for small tournaments greater
in U-type than in J-type tournaments, whereas J-type tournaments are pre-
ferred by the employer when the tournament size surpasses a critical value.
The intuition for this becomes clear by the derivatives of the (expected)
equilibrium eﬀorts with respect to the tournament size: Increased competi-
tion lowers incentives in U-type tournaments for non-RD as well as for RD
workers. But the same does not hold for J-type tournaments: RD workers’
equilibrium eﬀorts are independent of the tournament size, and the eﬀorts of
non-RD workers even raise with increased competition. In addition, we can
compare the two critical values of the tournament size for non-RD and RD
workers. Since ˆ n > ¯ n there exist tournament sizes for which the employer
prefers the U-type tournament when the workers are RD workers, whereas
he prefers the J-type tournament when the workers only care for absolute
incomes.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, the characteristics of U-type and J-type tournaments are com-
pared and discussed from an employer’s viewpoint. The major ﬁndings can
26be summarized as follows: (1) Neither U-type nor J-type tournaments yield
the ﬁrst-best solution although the workers are risk neutral. (2) Stable collu-
sion is more likely in U-type than in J-type tournaments. (3) When workers
have to invest in their human capital prior to the tournament, U-type tour-
naments are more problematic than J-type tournaments because of possible
heterogeneity among the workers. If, for example, the workers choose diﬀer-
ent investment levels, all incentives in the subsequent tournament may break
down. (4) When the tournament size becomes large, the employer’s expected
proﬁts are higher in J-type than in U-type tournaments. This result will also
hold qualitatively if workers feel relative deprivation.
27Appendix
Proof of Proposition1:
First, the U-type tournament is considered, which is similar to (rent-
seeking) contests (see, e.g., Hillman and Riley 1989; Hillman 1989, pp. 62-
67; Hirshleifer and Riley 1992, pp. 369-404).22In analogy to these contests,
there do not exist equilibria in pure strategies on the tournament stage: Let
pi (ei,ej) be worker i’s winning probability (i,j = A,B; i 6= j) so that his
expected utility can be written as
EUi (ei) = w2 + ∆w · pi (ei,ej) − c(ei). (1)
Worker i (i = A,B) at most exerts eﬀort ¯ e with ∆w = c(¯ e) ⇔ ¯ e = c−1 (∆w),
because higher eﬀorts would result in EUi (ei) < w2 in case of winning the
tournament. This outcome cannot be rational, since worker i can achieve
EUi (ei) = w2 with ei = 0. We can distinguish three cases: ei > ej
(i,j = A,B; i 6= j) cannot be an equilibrium, because worker i can reduce ei
and will still win the tournament. ei = ej < ¯ e cannot be an equilibrium, too,
since i can win with certainty by marginally increasing ei. ei = ej = ¯ e cannot
be an equilibrium, because i would prefer to choose ei = 0. Thus, there can
only exist equilibria in mixed strategies. From the literature on rent-seeking
contests it is also known that competition will result in complete rent dissi-
pation (see, e.g., Hillman 1989, p. 59; Baye, Kovenock and de Vries 1996, p.
28293). In this context, it means that EUi (ei) = w2 (i = A,B) in equilibrium.
Let Gj (ei) (i,j = A,B; i 6= j) be the probability that j chooses ei or less
eﬀort. Then, (1) can be rewritten as EUi (ei) = w2 + ∆wGj (ei) − c(ei).
The equilibrium condition EUi (ei) = w2 results in Gj (ei) = c(ei)/∆w.
Hence, on the tournament stage each worker chooses his eﬀort according to
the cumulative distribution function (cdf) G(x) = c(x)/∆w over the inter-
val [0,c−1 (∆w)]. On the ﬁrst stage, the employer has to choose w1 and w2.
Since incentives only depend on the prize spread ∆w and not on the absolute
prizes and since EUi (ei) = w2, the participation constraint EUi (ei) ≥ ¯ u will
always be binding, i.e. the employer minimizes labor costs and optimally
chooses w∗
2 = ¯ u. The incentive compatibility constraint is given by G(x).
As both workers behave symmetrically, the employer can consider one of the
workers for his objective function. Thus, the employer wants to maximize
E [qi] −
w1+w2














































29From Eq. (2) it becomes clear that theoretically the employer can choose w1






∆w dx equals ﬁrst-best eﬀort
eFB and that, in addition, this w1 may solve the ﬁrst-order condition (4). But
















where the last equality follows from integrating by parts. Thus, in the case
E [ei] = eFB the employer’s welfare would be 2eFB − ∆w − 2w2 = 2eFB −
2E [c(ei)]−2¯ u = 2eFB−2c
 
eFB
−2γ−2¯ u and the welfare of the two workers




which is smaller than ﬁrst-best welfare.





w − c(ei), i,j = A,B; i 6= j. (6)










0 (ei) = ejc
0 (ej). (7)






30The employer’s objective function is given by his proﬁts 2ei −w. Substituting
for w according to (8) leads to 2ei − 4eic0 (ei). If the employer wants to
implement ﬁrst-best eﬀort eFB, which is deﬁned by c0  
eFB
= 1, then his
proﬁts will be 2eFB − 4eFB < 0. But this cannot be optimal from the
employer’s viewpoint, because he can ensure himself zero proﬁts by choosing
w = 0.
Proof of Corollary 1:
In the U-type tournament with quadratic costs c(ei) = (k/2)e2
i the ﬁrst-













which results in E

eU






2)/2 = 4/(9k), because w∗
2 = ¯ u = 0 and w∗
1 = ∆w = 8/(9k). In
the J-type tournament the two workers behave identically so that it suﬃces
to consider one of the workers. The employer wants to maximize ei − w/2
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint (8) and the participation
constraint w/2 − c(ei) ≥ ¯ u = 0 ⇔ w/2 − (k/2)e2
i ≥ 0
(8)
⇔ w/2 − w/8 ≥ 0.
Hence, the participation constraint is non-binding. The incentive compatibil-
ity constraint (8) leads to ei =
p w
4k. Substituting in the employer’s objective












311/k = eFB and EΠJ = eJ − w/2 = 1/(8k) < EΠU < EΠFB = 1/(2k).
Proof of Propositon 2:
If the two workers collude in the U-type tournament supergame, they will
choose eA = eB = 0 and receive the expected utility


















, i = A,B, (10)
with δ as discount factor. If worker i deviates from the collusive agreement,
he will exert an arbitrarily small eﬀort ε. In this period he wins w1 with
certainty. But then because of the grim strategy cooperation breaks down
and the two workers will choose their mixed strategies G(x) and get an
expected utility w2 (see the proof of Proposition 1) in each of the subsequent
periods. Thus, worker i’s expected utility from deviating is approximately
EUi (ei = ε) = w1δ + w2δ
2 + w2δ
3 + ···










≤ 0 ⇒ δ ≥ 1
2 = δ
U.
Collusion in the J-type tournament yields the expected utility













32Deviating from the collusive agreement by choosing ei = ε gives
























where e∗ denotes the workers’ one-shot Nash equilibrium strategy charac-
terized by (8). The collusion will be stable, if EUi (ei = 0) ≥ EUi (ei = ε),















≤ w and the lower bound for the discount factor that meets (14)




33Proof of Proposition 3:
Let wi denote worker i’s wage (i = A,B). Then i’s relative deprivation
can be written as






(i,j = A,B; i 6= j). Thus, i wants to minimize the net income diﬀerence to
the other worker weighted with the relative size of the reference group.25In
the U-type tournament, i’s expected RD is described by













where Gj (ei) denotes the probability that j exerts ei or smaller eﬀort. In
analogy to the proof of Proposition 1, it can easily be checked that there does
not exist an equilibrium in pure strategies on the second stage: To see this we
can distinguish the same three cases with a new upper bound ¯ e = c−1 (2∆w).
From Eq. (16) i’s ﬁrst-order condition yields −∆wG0
j (ei) + c0 (ei)/2 = 0 ⇒
Gj (ei) = c(ei)/(2∆w) + α with α being a constant. Since Gj (0) = 0 and
Gj (c−1 (2∆w)) = 1, each worker’s mixed strategy in equilibrium is charac-
terized by the cdf G(x) = c(x)/(2∆w) over the interval [0,c−1 (2∆w)].


























Result (i) can be proved as follows. eJ
RD > eJ for a given w is obvious by

































which holds, because xc0 (x) is monotonely increasing and c−1 (2∆w) > 2c−1 (∆w)
due to the convexity of the cost function (i.e., the range of the interval on
the left-hand side of (19) is greater than the one on the right-hand side).
For result (ii) ﬁrst note that in both types of tournaments there is a
symmetric equilibrium. Thus, (expected) RD of each worker is always zero
in both tournaments. So we can neglect the participation constraint for both
tournaments or assume a reservation value ¯ R ≥ 0 so that the constraint
always holds. The employer’s expected proﬁts per worker in the U-type






















using the assumption of quadratic costs c(ei) = k
2e2
i. The employer optimally
chooses w∗
2 = 0 because incentives only depend on ∆w, and w∗
1 = 16/(9k)





= 16/(9k) and EΠU
RD = 8/(9k).













The proof of result (iii) is already sketched in the text and therefore
obmitted here.
Proof of Proposition 4a and Corollary 2:
Let the starting point be the scenario of Corollary 2 where aA and aB
can be chosen out of a wide range of possible values. Furthermore, let
aA > 0 and aB > 0 for a moment. Two cases have to be distinguished for








and we obtain the symmetric solution with mixed strategies described in
the proof of Proposition 1. If aA 6= aB, this symmetric solution will no
longer hold. Let ai < aj (i,j = A,B; i 6= j). Again, no equilibria in pure
strategies are possible for the third stage because of the arguments given in
the proof of Proposition 1 which, in analogy, hold for the asymmetric case,
too. The maximum eﬀort worker i is willing to choose is characterized by
∆w = c(¯ ei) ⇔ ¯ ei = c−1 (∆w). Worker j’s maximum eﬀort ¯ ej is lower and
meets aj¯ ej = ai¯ ei ⇔ ¯ ej =
ai
aj ¯ ei =
ai
ajc−1 (∆w). Any eﬀort higher than ¯ ej
would only increase j’s costs c(ej) without raising j’s winning probability,
36because prob{aiei ≤ aj¯ ej} = 1 given the workers’ continuous mixed strate-
gies. It is obvious that worker j could always win with certainty by exerting
eﬀort ej = ¯ ei + ε with ε → 0. But this cannot be an equilibrium, since i’s
best response would be ei = 0 which would then imply ej = ε with ε → 0 as
j’s best response and so on. In equilibrium, j’s expected utility will meet

































with cdf GY (·).
Eq. (22) describes the cdf according to which worker i chooses
ai
ajei in equi-
librium. Hence, i’s mixed strategy for his eﬀort is characterized by the cdf















with x[0, ¯ ei]. On the other hand, in equilibrium the expected utility of
worker i has to be w2 for the same argument given above concerning worker
j. Thus






aiej ∈ [0, ¯ ei] and GZ (·) as the cdf of Z. Worker j’s mixed strategy
















37Let ˜ c(ai) and ˜ c(aj) be the costs for the workers’ human capital investments
ai and aj on the second stage. Then their total expected utilities for the
symmetric (aA = aB) and the asymmetric case (ai < aj; i,j = A,B; i 6= j)
can be calculated as follows: If aA = aB, then
EUA = EUB = w2 − ˜ c(ai) = w2 − ˜ c(aj). (26)
If ai < aj, then
EUi = w2 +
Z ¯ ei
0
[∆wGZ (ei) − c(ei)]G
0
i (ei)dei − ˜ c(ai) = w2 − ˜ c(ai) (27)





[∆wGY (ej) − c(ej)]G
0
j (ej)dej − ˜ c(aj)






− ˜ c(aj). (28)













c(¯ ei) = ∆w.
Now, Proposition 4a can be proved as follows: On the second stage, the
workers have to choose aA ,aB ∈ {0,1} at costs ˜ c(0) = 0 and ˜ c(1) = ¯ c. Given
that worker i chooses ai = 0, worker j yields EUj = w2 with aj = 0 according
to (26) and EUj = w1 − ¯ c with aj = 1 according to (28) (i,j = A,B; i 6= j).
Given that worker i chooses ai = 1, worker j obtains EUj = w2 with aj = 0
according to (27) and EUj = w2 − ¯ c with aj = 1 according to (26). Hence,
if ∆w ≥ ¯ c the subgame consisting of the second and the third stage will
38have two equilibria (I) and (II): The workers choose a∗
i = 0 and a∗
j = 1
(i,j = A,B; i 6= j) on the second stage, and e∗
i = 0 and e∗
j = ε with ε → 0
on the third stage. On the ﬁrst stage, the employer chooses w∗
1 = w∗
2 = 0
to avoid negative proﬁts. Thus, the two cases (I) and (II) coincide to the
subgame perfect equilibrium (i) where the employer makes the two workers
not to participate in the tournament.
It can easily be seen that there is a second subgame perfect equilibrium
(ii) where the two workers randomize between the two cases (I) and (II)
considered above. Let pi0 be the probability with which worker i chooses
ai = 0 and 1−pi0 the probability for choosing ai = 1. Deﬁne pj0 and 1−pj0
analogously for worker j. Then i’s and j’s expected utilities on the second
stage can be written as
EUi = pi0w2 + (1 − pi0)pj0 (w1 − ¯ c) + (1 − pi0)(1 − pj0)(w2 − ¯ c) (29)
EUj = pj0w2 + (1 − pj0)pi0 (w1 − ¯ c) + (1 − pj0)(1 − pi0)(w2 − ¯ c).(30)
Therefore, the optimal mixed strategies for the two workers on the second
stage are
pi0 = pj0 =
¯ c
∆w
; 1 − pi0 = 1 − pj0 =
∆w − ¯ c
∆w
. (31)
On the third stage, the workers’ choices depend on the realizations of the
mixed strategies: e∗
i = 0 if a∗
i = 0, and e∗
i = ε if a∗
i = 1 and a∗
j = 0
39(i,j = A,B; i 6= j), which directly follows from the two asymmetric cases (I)
and (II). If, however, a∗
i = a∗
j = 1 have been realized, then we will have the
symmetric solution of the basic model without human capital investment (see
the proof of Proposition1): Both workers choose their eﬀorts randomly out of
the interval [0,c−1 (∆w)] according to the cdf G(x) = c(x)/∆w. On the ﬁrst
stage, the employer has to choose w1 and w2. Irrespective of the realizations
of the workers’ mixed strategies, at most one of the workers will have the
expected utility EUi = w2 ≥ ¯ u. Since incentives are only created by ∆w
and not by the absolute value of w2, the employer optimally chooses w∗
2 = ¯ u.
Furthermore, he knows that the two workers will only realize strictly positive
expected eﬀorts with joint probability (∆w − ¯ c)
2 /∆w2. In this state, we have
the symmetric case of the basic model without human capital investment and
the employer chooses w1 to maximize (∆w − ¯ c)
2 /∆w2 times the expression
given by (3) (see the proof of Proposition 1) subject to ∆w ≥ ¯ c which ensures
that ai = aj = 1 is rational from the workers’ viewpoint.
Corollary 2 can be proved as follows: Let ai and aj be continuous variables
or discrete with more than two realizations. Then there cannot exist an
equilibrium in pure strategies on the second stage of the U-type tournament
game. To see this, Eq. (28) has to be considered: We can start, for example,
with ai = 0. j’s best response to this would be aj = ε with ε → 0. Then i’s
40best response would be ˆ ai with













But then j’s best response would be ˆ aj with













and so on. Thus, each of the two workers wants to be the stronger player
with the higher amount of human capital to get EUj according to Eq. (28)
instead of EUi according to Eq. (27). But since ˜ c(ai) and ˜ c(aj) increase in
ai and aj, respectively, there will exist some level of human capital investment
so that overbidding is not optimal for the other worker any longer, who
therefore chooses a zero investment level as his best response. But then the
ﬁrst worker would choose ε as a best response and so on. Altogether, both
workers will choose ˆ ai and ˆ aj as mixed strategies over the interval from zero
to a certain upper bound which is identical for both workers. Note, that
even in the case of continuous variables ˆ ai and ˆ aj the two workers would not
marginally increase their investment levels but would choose discrete jumps.
This becomes clear from Eq. (28): If ˆ ai and ˆ aj only marginally diﬀer from
each other, then the worker with the higher investment level − for example
worker j − will approximately obtain EUj = w2 + ∆w − c(¯ ei) − ˜ c(aj) =
w2 − ˜ c(aj), which is less than the expected utility w2 when dropping out of
the tournament at the beginning.
41Proof of Proposition 4b:
The proposition states that in the J-type tournament there exists a sym-
metric equilibrium in pure strategies. The workers’ ﬁrst-order conditions for














2 e∗ = c
0 (e
∗), (35)
if ai and aj are both diﬀerent from zero. Now, the subgame consisting of
the last two stages is considerd. We have to distinguish four cases: (a) If
ai = aj = 0, then qi = qj = 0 and EUi = w
2 −c(ei) and EUi = w
2 −c(ej). On
the third stage, the two workers choose e∗
i = e∗
j = 0 and get EUi = EUj = w
2.
(b), (c) If ai = 0 and aj = 1 (or, in analogy, ai = 1 and aj = 0), then
qi = 0 and qj = ej. On the second stage, the workers’ expected utilities
are EUi = −c(ei) and EUj = w − c(ej) − ¯ c. Given that w > ¯ c, on the
third stage the workers choose e∗
i = 0 and e∗
j = ε with ε → 0 and receive
EUi = 0 and EUj = w−¯ c.26(d) If ai = aj = 1, then we have the basic model
of Proposition 1 and (8) and (35) are identical: w/(4e∗) = c0 (e∗). Both
workers receive EUi = EUj = w
2 −c(e∗)−¯ c. On the ﬁrst stage, the employer
anticipates the four cases (a)-(d) and wants to implement (d), which is the
42only case where the workers exert strictly positive eﬀorts. Therefore, the
employer chooses w to maximize e − w/2 subject to w/(4e) = c0 (e) and
w/2 − c(e) − ¯ c ≥ ¯ u.
Proof of Proposition 5a:
The symmetric equilibrium can be proved in analogy to the proof of
Proposition 1 (see especially Eq. (3)) and by using the general result from
rent seeking contests that there is complete rent dissipation. In this context,
it means that each worker’s mixed strategy is given by G(x) over the interval
[0,c−1 (∆w)] with w2+∆wGn−1 (x)−c(x) = w2. For the claim of a continuum
of asymmetric equilibria see, in analogy, Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1996),
p. 293. An intuition is sketched in the text.
Comparative statics for the symmetric equilibrium can be derived from
the ﬁrst-order condition for w∗






















1/dn = −[∂F U/∂n]/[∂F U/∂w∗
1] by the implicit-function rule, where
∂F U/∂w∗























with ∆w = w∗
1 − ¯ u. The integral is negative, because the logarithm of the
cdf, ln[(c(x)/∆w)
1
n−1], takes only negative values. Altogether, we obtain
43dw∗














where ∆w = w∗
1(n)− ¯ u with dw∗
1/dn > 0. Applying Leibniz’ rule the deriva-
tive of E[eU

























The sign of this expression is ambiguous because of the second term in brack-
ets which contains the logarithm of the cdf, and crucially depends on n and
the shape of the cost function c(ei) which both determine ∆w and dw∗
1/dn
in equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 5b:























Let, for example, i = 1 and k = 2 so that Eq. (38) implies
c
0 (e1)(e1 + e3 + e4 + ··· + en) = c
0 (e2)(e2 + e3 + e4 + ··· + en). (39)
Since c0 (·) is monotonely increasing, it must hold that e1 = e2. This can be
done in analogy with any pair {i,k} (i,k = 1,··· ,n; i 6= k) so that we have
44e1 = e2 = ··· = eJ












The employer’s optimization problem on the ﬁrst stage is then similar to
the one in Proposition 4b. The claim that eJ
n < eFB is obtained from the









. If the employer
wants to implement ﬁrst-best eﬀort eFB with c0  
eFB
= 1, his objective
function will become eFB − n
n−1eFB < 0. Thus, since c0 (·) is monotonely
increasing, the employer always wants to implement an eJ
n < eFB.
For the comparative static result we have to consider the employer’s ob-
jective function mentioned in the last paragraph. The ﬁrst-order condition














































Note that the denominator has to be negative as second-order condition for
eJ
n.
Proof of Proposition 6:
Proposition 6 can be proved in analogy to Proposition 2. In the U-type
tournament a worker’s expected utility will be [w1 + (n − 1)w2]/n·δ/(1 − δ)
45if keeping the collusive agreement, and w1δ+(w2δ
2)/(1 − δ) if deviating from
collusion. Thus, collusion will be stable if δ ≥ (n − 1)/n = δ
U
n. In the J-type
tournament, a worker’s expected utility will be w/n · δ/(1 − δ) if keeping








2/(1 − δ) if breaking it.



















n. The claim about the connection of the inﬂuence of
w and the shape of the cost function can be shown as follows: Diﬀerentiating





























where D denotes the denominator of the right-hand side of (41). By implicitly
diﬀerentiating (40) we get deJ





































Proof of Proposition 7:
46First, non-RD workers are considered. As we know from Proposition























































with ∆w = w∗








































Since 1/n decreases in n and the logarithm of the cdf, ln[(c(x)/∆w)
1
n−1],
takes only negative values, EΠU
n is a decreasing function of n for suﬃciently



















> 0. Thus, for suﬃ-
ciently large n we have EΠU
n < EΠJ
n.
Second, n-person tournaments with RD workers are considered. In the
















where e∗ denotes the eﬀort of one of the other workers who − according to the
symmetry assumption − behave identically. Then, in analogy to Proposition
3 we get the result that each worker’s mixed strategy is described by the cdf
G(x) = (c(x)/[2∆w])
1
n−1 over the interval [0,c−1 (2∆w)]. In analogy to the














1 + (n − 1)¯ w2
n
, (48)
where ¯ w2 is the lowest possible loser prize satisfying the participation con-








































































e∗ − ei P
j
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Diﬀerentiating with respect to ei and using the symmetry assumption e1 =
··· = en = eJ




























n,RD/dn = 0 and deJ
n,RD/dn = 0 in equilibrium, which completes
the proof of Proposition 7(i)-(ii).
Proof of Corollary 3:
Result (i) can easily be proved by explicitly calculating the subgame per-
fect equilibria for the U-type and the J-type tournament using quadratic
costs c(ei) = k
2e2
i. We obtain w∗














k (n + 1)
2
for the U-type tournament,
and w∗ = (n − 1)/(4k) and eJ
n = (n − 1)/(2kn) and EΠJ
n = (n − 1)/(4kn)
for the J-type tournament. The claims of result (i) immediately follow from
these expressions.
Result (ii) deals with tournaments between n RD workers. With quadratic


















k (n + 1)
2
in the U-type tournament, and w∗ = n/(4k) and eJ
n,RD = 1/(2k)
and EΠJ
n,RD = 1/(4k) in the J-type tournament. The claims of Corollary
3(ii) directly follow from these expressions.27
50Notes
1. The following arguments also hold for human capital investments, but
for brevity only unveriﬁable outputs are considered here.
2. The labels ”U-type” and ”J-type” are used here, because the two types
of tournaments can also be found in other countries, and because the
following analysis does not oﬀer a complete comparison of typical U.S.
and Japanese incentive systems.
3. Such bonuses can make up 18-30% of a worker’s yearly income; see
Itoh (1991, pp. 348-350), Kanemoto and MacLeod (1992, p. 145), Ito
(1992, pp. 231-239).
4. In the traditional Japanese ﬁrm, there are no deﬁnite demarcation lines
between ”jobs”. Thus, the U-type solution by attaching wages to jobs
cannot be used here.
5. Of course, assuming deterministic production describes a highly styl-
ized situation. But this simpliﬁcation is comparable to the assumption
of a risk neutral principal instead of a less risk averse principal (com-
pared to the agent) in principal agent models. Technically, the mixed
strategy equilibria in the U-type tournament sketch the situation of
Lazear-Rosen tournaments with too less noise so that the second-order
51condition for a pure strategy equilibrium does not hold. In the J-type
tournament below, ei/(ei + ej) = qi/(qi + qj) is a good approximation
when there is low noise (see Theorem 4 in Mood, Graybill and Boes
1974, p. 181), since the error terms are usually i.i.d. in tournaments.
6. Tournament models often use linear production functions; see, e.g., the
seminal paper of Lazear and Rosen (1981). Here, I will focus on the
unveriﬁability problem and do not add an exogenous noise component
to ei.
7. c
0−1(·) denotes the inverse of the workers’ marginal cost function.
8. But even in this case there is a welfare loss, because realized eﬀort will
usually diﬀer from eFB.
9. See, e.g., Dye (1984), p. 148; McLaughlin (1988), p. 248; Milgrom and
Roberts (1992), p. 369.
10. Since collusion is illegal, such an agreement cannot be enforced by
contract, but has to be self-enforcing.
11. Using the grim strategy (or trigger strategy) worker i begins playing his
collusive eﬀort ei = 0. Worker i remains playing ei = 0 as long as the
other worker j has chosen zero eﬀort in the last round. But if the other
worker j chooses an eﬀort diﬀerent from zero, worker i will switch to
52his Nash equilibrium strategy of the one-shot tournament and will keep
on playing it in each of the subsequent rounds. Of course, according to
the Folk Theorem there may be a wide range of equilibria which lead
to stable collusions. But for simplicity, the analysis is restricted to pos-
sible equilibria in grim strategies. Moreover, grim strategies have the
desirable property that they can result in subgame perfect equilibria.
12. Stark (1987, 1990) introduces the RD concept in the discussion of tour-
naments. For a modelling of tournarments with RD based on net in-
come see Kr¨ akel (2000).
13. For a formal description of the workers’ objective functions see Eq. (15)
in the Appendix.
14. The following results will qualitatively hold, if we assume ai ∈ {aL,aH}
with aL < aH and costs cL for aL and cH for aH.
15. Since ε → 0, the terms with ε and c(ε) have been neglected for sim-
plicity when deriving the optimal strategies for the ﬁrst and the second
stage.
16. Note that ∆w cannot be increased by lowering w2, as w∗
2 = ¯ u is ﬁxed.
17. See Eq. (3) in the Appendix.
5318. This is obvious for (i). For (ii) see the proof of Proposition 4a in the
Appendix.
19. For the following considerations see the proofs of Proposition 4a and
Corollary 2. Especially, note that for aj > ai worker i’s mixed strategy








ajx)/∆w over the interval [0, ¯ ei] with ¯ ei = c−1 (∆w). Thus, worker
i’s drop-out probability mentioned below (i.e., Gi (0)) tends to 1 for
aj → ∞ or ai → 0.
20. The three-stage tournament with human capital investment will not
be discussed for n > 2 workers, because there will not be new insights
from this modeling. For example, in the U-type tournament with many
investment levels we will have competition between n heterogeneous
workers. In analogy to the contest literature, we should then expect
an asymmetric equilibrium, where the two strongest players compete
against each other and the n−2 other workers drop out (see, e.g., Baye,
Kovenock and de Vries 1996, p. 297).
21. Of course, the expected utilities depend on w1 and w2 which may de-
pend on n, but the condition for stable collusion is independent of
w1 and w2.
5422. The main diﬀerences to rent-seeking contests are that in tournaments
workers have convex cost functions and the prizes are optimally chosen
by an employer.
23. J-type tournaments are similar to logit-form contests (see, e.g., Dixit
1987, p. 893). The major diﬀerences are the convex cost function and
the endogeneous wage bill w.
24. The second-order conditions always hold in the J-type tournament.
25. Note that this formulation of RD is more general than the deﬁnition
in Kr¨ akel (2000), where a worker only feels relatively deprived when
becoming a loser in the tournament.
26. c(ε) is neglected because of c(ε) → 0.
27. Note that again w∗
2 = 0 in the U-type tournament.
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